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Discriminatory Regulation of Trial
Publicity: A Caveat for the Bar
JOEL

I.

H. SWIFT*

INTRODUCTION

In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,' the United States Supreme
Court raised an issue in the fair trial - free speech discussion it had
never before considered. For a half century prior to 1991, all speakers
had been treated equally under a single standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of sanctions for assertedly improper trial publicity. 2
Gentile, however, created a special class of speakers by upholding a
lesser standard for sanctioning the speech of participating attorneys
in a criminal case. 3 The Court's analysis, 4 although open to disagreement,5 does support its holding and it is not the purpose of this article
to challenge the conclusion that participating attorneys are a distinct
and different class of speaker.
However, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion striking down a
disciplinary sanction against a criminal defense attorney6 relies in
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College
of Law; B.A. Wagner College, 1959; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1962; LL.M.
University of Pennsylvania, 1979. Gratitude is expressed to Ms. Carol Haffercamp
for her research assistance.
1. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
2. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1941) ("clear and present
danger" test applicable to speech of newspaper and official of civil litigant). Accord,
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1962) (sheriff); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 371-73 (1947) (newspaper); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335-36 (1946)
(newspaper).
3. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745 ("The 'substantial likelihood' test ... is
constitutional ... for it is designed to protect the integrity and fairness of a state's
judicial system, and it imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers'
speech.").
4. See generally, id. at 2740-45.
5. See generally, id. at 2724-26 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (clear and present
danger, or comparable standard, applicable to all discussion of pending judicial
proceedings).
6. There were two majority opinions in Gentile. Justice Kennedy wrote one
opinion of the Court, id. at 2723-38; Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote another, id. at
2738-45. Justice O'Connor joined both, id. at 2748-49.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

substantial part on the fact that within the special class of attorneyspeakers there are two sub-categories, prosecutors and defense counsel, and that the publicity regulation created an "impermissible risk
of discriminatory enforcement ' ' 7 against the latter. This article will
demonstrate that discriminatory enforcement is a valid concern; that
the organized bar has tended to disregard the unarguable fact that
the problem of attorney publicity is primarily one of prosecutorial
publicity,' but has devoted substantial attention to curbing publicity
by defense attorneys, 9 notwithstanding the important political nature
of such speech.' 0
II.

THE POLITICAL SPEECH INTERESTS

It seems unnecessary to examine at length the value of public
discussion of pending criminal cases. The Justices in Gentile were
unanimous in their view that such discussion is important political
speech. Chief Justice Rehnquist points out that "the criminal justice
system exists in a larger context of a government ultimately of the
people, who wish to be informed about happenings in the criminal
justice system, and, if sufficiently informed about those happenings
might wish to make changes in the system."" Justice Kennedy emphatically asserts that attorney discussion of pending judicial proceedings "involves classic political speech," 1 2 particularly when "directed
at public officials and their conduct in office,"'" and thus is "speech
critical of the exercise of the State's power [which] lies at the very
center of the First Amendment."' ' 4 Justice Kennedy points, as well,
to the significance of timely public discussion"5 "question[ing] the
judgment of an elected public prosecutor[,] . . .grant[ed] vast discretion .... ",16
7. Id. at 2732 ("[Hjistory shows that speech is suppressed when either the
speaker or the message is critical of those who enforce the law.").
8. See infra notes 17-152 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 153-202 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
11. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. at 2720, 2742 (1991) (Rehnquist,
C.J., plurality).

12. Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
13. Id. (Kennedy, J., plurality). Justice Kennedy explains that attorney Gentile's
statements suggested that the State was seeking to convict an innocent man as a
"'scapegoat"', id., and that the persons actually guilty of the crime charged were
public officials ('crooked cops'). Id.
14. Id. (Kennedy, J., plurality).

15. Id. (Kennedy, J., plurality) (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
268-69 (1941)).
16. Id. at 2725 (opinion by Kennedy, J.).

TRIAL PUBLICITY

1992:399]

A defense attorney's opportunity to speak out about perceived
injustices in a pending case, therefore, serves not only to protect the
accused from unfairness, but also to inform the public about the
workings of the criminal justice system and motivate necessary change.
These interests must be borne in mind as disciplinary action is
considered. The organized bar, when applying the standard upheld in
Gentile, must be particularly careful that it does not over-regulate
speech critical of the government.

III.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

There is no paucity of information about trial publicity. The
American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and
Free Press, 7 which proposed the predecessor to the rule at issue in
Gentile,' conducted an exhaustive study and relied in its recommendation not only on its own examination 9 but also on the Report of
the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 20 law review articles by Professor Louis L. Jaffe 2 and attorney
J. Thomas McCarthy, 22 studies by Alfred Friendly and Ronald Goldfarb, 23 and John Lofton, 24 and the Report of the Special Committee
on Radio, Television and the Administration of Justice of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. 25 This section will examine
each of these sources and will demonstrate that they do support the
conclusion that prosecutorial trial publicity is a problem deserving
attention, but provide limited evidence of harmful defense publicity.
The first three of these authorities are not particularly extensive
and can be disposed of quickly. The Warren Commission Report
17. STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Advisory Committee

on Fair Trial & Free Press, A.B.A) (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter 1968 Advisory
Committee Report].
18. 111 S. Ct. at 2745 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality) (Nevada Supreme Court
Rule 177 derived from A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6). See
id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
19. STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Advisory Committee

on Fair Trial & Free Press, A.B.A) (Tentative Draft 1966) [hereinafter 1966 Advisory
Committee Report]. See infra notes 30-79 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 19 n. 1; see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
21. Id. at 76 n.212; see infra notes 27, 29 and accompanying text.
22. Id.; see infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
23. 1968 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 15 n.1; see infra notes
113-29 and accompanying text.

24. 1968 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 15 n.1; see infra notes
131-44 and accompanying text.
25. 1968 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 37 n.57; see infra notes
80-112 and accompanying text.
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indicated that the District Attorney announced and held press confer26
ences during the two days following the President's assassination.
However, the accused was himself assassinated before defense counsel
was retained or appointed and the Report thus makes no mention of
defense publicity. Both the Jaffe27 and McCarthy 28 articles clearly
indicate that the fair trial problem derives either from the release of
29
information by public officials or diligent investigation by reporters.
Neither points to an illustration of publicity by a defense attorney.
These authorities, to the extent that they consider participating attorney publicity at all, thus support the conclusion that publicity by
prosecutors is a potential problem; they do not support the judgment
that defense attorneys are also a part of the problem.
In its discussion of the nature and scope of the problem of
extrajudicial publicity, the A.B.A. Advisory Committee made clear
that the issue involved potential interference with the fair trial rights
of criminal defendants. Consequently, it pointed out that trial publicity can interfere with "the basic rights of the individual," 30 can create
a "likelihood that ill-timed public statements will convey information
to the future triers of fact that was obtained in violation of those
rights,"'" that "remedies . .. designed to protect an accused" 3 2 will
be rendered useless, and that "adverse publicity ... may ... lead
an accused ... to prefer a negotiated plea." ' 33 This introduction to

the issue said nothing suggesting that the fair trial rights of the
government were of concern.

In the section of its General Commentary entitled, "[sipecific
examples of potentially prejudicial material,''34 the Advisory Committee found that extrajudicial publicity was a problem at three stages
26. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESI-

DENT KENNEDY 193, 216-18 (McGraw-Hill 1964).
27. Louis L. Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 504 (1965)
[hereinafter Jaffe].
28. J. Thomas McCarthy, Fair Trial and Prejudicial Publicity: A Need for
Reform, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1965) [hereinafter McCarthy].

29. Jaffe, supra note 27, at 504 ("The information may come from the police

or the prosecution; it may be uncovered by reportorial diligence."); McCarthy, supra

note 28, at 91 ("[Ilt can accurately be said that the source of prejudicial publicity is
twofold: (1)news media itself - press, radio, and television, and (2) the original
source - prosecuting attorneys and the police.").
30. 1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19, at 21.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 22.
33. Id.
34. Id.at 25 (emphasis in original).
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of a criminal prosecution. Examining the first stage, before arrest or
formal charge, the Committee illustrated the problem through reference to People v. Duncan,3 where the prosecutor during the investigation publicly characterized the crime as a "brutal, calculated,
revolting killing for hire." 3 6
During the second stage, between arrest or formal charge and
the beginning of trial, the Committee cited Stroble v. California37 and
United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno as examples of "occasions
when [potentially prejudicial publicity was] released by the office of
the prosecutor, ' 3a and Stroble,4° Bloeth, 4' and Fouquette v. Bernard42
as illustrations of "instances in which [prosecutors] appear to have
gone to considerable lengths to put their case before the public in
43
advance of trial."
Finally, during the period between commencement of trial and
rendering of the verdict, the Committee provided six illustrations in
support of its statement, "[o]ne significant difference between the
pretrial and trial stages is that the source of potentially prejudicial
information is more often the prosecutor and very seldom the police
official. "" These included:
After an interview with the prosecutor during the trial, a
newspaper published a story that the defendant had offered
to bribe a witness - a story that was unsubstantiated by the
evidence. Copies of the newspaper were found in the jury
room .41

35. 350 P.2d 103, 107 (Cal. 1960), cert. dismissed, 366 U.S. 417 (1961).
36. Id. at 107; 1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19 at 26.
37. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
38. 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
39. 1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19, at 30.
40. 226 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Cal. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) ("The District
Attorney, even before defendant completed his statement, released to the press details
of the statement . .. and also announced his belief that defendant was guilty and
sane.").
41. 313 F.2d at 366-67 n.1 (.'As far as I am concerned;' said Cohalan [the
District Attorney for Suffolk County] 'Bloeth is legally sane and will stand trial for

three murders. He knew what he was doing and that it was wrong to do it."').
42. 198 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1952) ('On behalf of law-abiding American
citizenry, I am extremely anxious that Fouquette not be found mentally incompetent,
so that he may again be paroled, run amok, and claim the lives of other innocent
men and wreak the lives of their families."').
43. 1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19, at 34-35.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id. at 41 (citing United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

Newspaper articles appearing during the trial quoted the
prosecutor as saying that five of the defendants had offered
to turn state's evidence and that the prosecutor was saving
three confessions 'as an ace in the hole.' One member of the
jury had been seen with one of the newspapers. 46
A local paper in the District of Columbia carried the
headline 'Prosecution Charges That Boy Slayer Of Two Here
Killed Man Near Boston.' The jury had been instructed to
look only at the headlines and to avoid the text of any articles
relating to the case.47
A prosecutor was quoted in a newspaper story as saying
that the best advice counsel could have given the defendant
was to try to escape from the courtroom and that 'even in
memory it [the killing] brings a smile to his [defendant's]
lips.' 4
Following the admission at trial of a statement by one
defendant, with references to the other defendants omitted, a
newspaper article quoted the prosecutor as saying that the
One
statement 'definitely implicated' all three defendants.
49
juror admitted that he had read 'part' of the article.
A newspaper article reported that the prosecutor had
intended to put in the record evidence of a prior conviction
for highway robbery but was prevented by the defendant's
refusal to testify. One juror said he 'probably' read the
article.5 0
It is noteworthy that in its search for examples of improper prosecutorial publicity at all three stages of criminal cases, the Advisory
Committee found it unnecessary to go beyond the majority opinions
of reviewing courts. Undoubtedly, had it chosen to do so, the Advisory
Committee could have uncovered numerous additional illustrations
not mentioned in judicial opinions.
Such was not the case, however, with the Committee's effort to
identify what it described as "occasional instances"'" of improper
defense counsel publicity. No illustrations of assertedly improper
defense counsel publicity at the first stage of the prosecution were
provided.52 The only asserted illustration of second stage publicity by
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 42 (citing Griffin v. United States, 295 F. 437 (3d Cir. 1924)).
Id. (citing McHenry v. United States, 276 F. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921)).
Id. (citing People v. Gomez, 258 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1953)).
Id. (citing Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1958)).
Id. (citing United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945)).
Id.at 42.
See id. at 25-27.
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defense counsel is United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno. 3 In order
to reach this conclusion, however, the Advisory Committee found it
necessary to rely upon the dissenting opinion in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.5 4 The Advisory Committee
thus ignored the holding of the Second Circuit majority, sitting en
banc, which expressly rejected the assertion of the state and the
dissent that defense counsel publicity had a causal connection to the
constitutional violation." This stretch by the Advisory Committee is
indicative of the lengths to which one must go to find even asserted
examples of improper defense counsel publicity.
A similar effort was necessary for the Advisory Committee to
find an illustration of third stage, at trial, publicity by defense counsel.
The sole instance referred to in this context relies upon the brief of
the State of Ohio in Sheppard v. Ohio, 6 accusing defense counsel of
using the press to prejudice the state's case. The United States Supreme
Court, however, apparently found little to support the State's claim."
In an extremely meticulous description of the facts of that case,
covering some thirteen pages of its opinion,5" the Court placed substantial emphasis upon improper activities of the police,5 9 the Coroner, 60 the news media, 6' and the actual conduct of the trial, 62 without
even a mention of defense misconduct.
53. 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963), cited
in 1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19 at 37.
54. 313 F.2d at 378-79 (Lombard, J. dissenting) ("It was the strategy of the
defense almost from the day on which the petitioner was arrested to broadcast as
widely as possible every fact and argument which would support the theory that
petitioner was insane ....

[Defense counsel] kept reporters informed of the steps

being taken to establish the defense of insanity.").
55. Bloeth, 313 F.2d at 372 ("But the ultimate responsibility lies with the state:
It successfully opposed the change of venue requested by substituted counsel to
obviate the effects of prejudicial publicity to which the District Attorney had heavily
contributed. This disavowal of the tactics of Bloeth's original counsel cannot be
ignored.").
56. 135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910 (1956).
During the trial most of the publicity was given out by the defense. As
a former newspaper man, defense counsel knew very well how to get
favorable stories in the public press and he was quite successful. He held
press conferences daily and frequently more than once each day ....

The

amount of publicity so put out by the defense was enormous, and far
outshadowed the attention given by the State.
1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19, at 43 (quoting Brief for the State
of Ohio, at 18-19).
57. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
58. Id. at 337-49.
59. Id. at 337-41, 346-49.
60. Id. at 337-40.
61. Id. at 345-48.
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The Court's opinion also devoted attention to the prosecuting
attorneys, pointing out that the trial was conducted concurrently with
an active political campaign in which the chief prosecutor was a
candidate for judicial office. 63 In addition, three days after the crime,
on the day of the victim's funeral, a prosecuting attorney criticized64
Sheppard's family to the press for refusing to permit questioning,
although in fact Sheppard had "made himself available for frequent65
and extended questioning without the presence of an attorney.
Newspapers thereafter "repeatedly stressed Sheppard's [alleged] lack
of cooperation with the police and other officials."' ' Finally, one of
the members of the prosecuting team reported that he had interviewed
Sheppard for nine hours and had concluded that Sheppard had refused
to take a lie detector test. 67 In contrast, the opinion contains not a
single specification of publicity, proper or improper, by defense
counsel. In light of the fact that the Supreme Court did not limit its
opinion to the reasons for reversing Sheppard's conviction, but also
suggested prophylactic measures that might have been taken to protect
the trial from excessive publicity, 68 this failure to identify any improper
69
conduct by defense counsel is significant.
Consequently, although the Advisory Committee's "[s]pecific
examples of potentially prejudicial material' 70 identified numerous
61. Id. at 345-48.

62. Id. at 342-45, 347, 349.
63. Id. at 342.

64. Id. at 338.
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 339.
68. Id. at 363.
69. In the final sentence of the body of its opinion, the Court did say that

"[clollaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness
of a criminal trial .. . is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures."

Id. at 363. As applied to prosecutors, there was ample support in the Court's opinion
for this conclusion. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.

Since, however, there was no evidence or finding by the Court of any collaboration between defense counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness

of the trial, this statement should not be read to include defense counsel, and to the

extent that it is deemed to apply to defense counsel it is an advisory opinion, beyond
the authority of a federal court. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961)
(citations omitted); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTs 40 (3d ed. 1976) ("[T]he oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law
of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions .. ..
cited in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
70. See supra notes 34-69 and accompanying text.

1992:3991

TRIAL PUBLICITY

examples of prejudicial prosecutorial publicity solely by looking to
judicial opinions, the only two specific examples of asserted prejudicial
defense counsel publicity it identified, Bloeth and Sheppard, were not
found to be prejudicial by reviewing courts. This fact suggests that
the Advisory Committee engaged in a partisan effort to make a case
for including defense counsel in the proposed regulatory language,
rather than an unbiased search for a real connection between defense
attorney publicity and trial fairness.
In addition to its examination of specific examples, the Advisory
Committee engaged in empirical research, conducting newspaper content analyses of the largest circulation newspaper in Pittsfield, Massachusetts for twelve months and in Newark, New Jersey and San
Francisco, California for six months. 7' The Committee's summary of
these analyses reports six occasions on which prosecutors disclosed
evidence or information about tests or their results, four expressions
of prosecutorial opinions on the merits or strength of the case, three
disclosures of prior convictions, and three comments on defense
motions. Not a single disclosure of evidence or opinions on the merits
72
by defense counsel was reported.
A second study of the leading newspaper in twenty randomly
selected cities over a one month period uncovered four prosecutorial
disclosures of evidence but no improper publicity by defense counsel.7
In summarizing this study, the Advisory Committee stated, "[iln
virtually every . .. case[] [of potential prejudice], the exercise of
restraint by the public officials involved ... would have substantially
'74
reduced if not eliminated the threat to a fair and impartial trial."
Finally, the Advisory Committee submitted questionnaires to both
prosecutors and defense attorneys, among others, in the twenty cities
referred to above. 75 The first question asked of defense counsel was,
"On how many occasions have you handled criminal cases in which
you thought reporting by the news media created a significant problem
of possible prejudice to the defendant?" Eighty-three percent of
respondents indicated they had handled such cases. 76 The significance
of these responses is of limited value to the issue under discussion,
however, because the question was not limited to prosecutorial pub-

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19, app. A at 158-59.
Id. app. B, tbl. I at 197-98.
Id. app. B, tbl. 1I-I at 203.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
Id. app. A at 160.

76. Id. app. C at 252.
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licity, and because no similar question was asked of prosecutors.7 7 At
the same time, the absence of a similar question on the prosecutors'
questionnaire provides some insight into the views of the Advisory
Committee as to the nature of the problem, although apparently not
its beliefs as to the proper solution. 71 If, in fact, the Committee had
considered defense publicity to be a real, or even likely part of the
problem, there is no rational explanation for the failure to inquire of
prosecutors about it. Indeed, the Committee's decision not to include
such a question reinforces its statements that extrajudicial publicity is
a problem for the accused, not the government.79
In sum, the extensive study of the issue of trial publicity conducted by the Advisory Committee to the American Bar Association
discloses three things: 1) to the extent that participating attorney
publicity was considered, it was the general perception of the Committee that the problem is one of prosecutorial, not defense publicity;
2) the specific examples of prejudicial publicity by participating
attorneys identified by the Committee consisted almost exclusively of
prosecutorial publicity, with the two examples of defense counsel
publicity being of highly questionable reliability; and 3) the empirical
research conducted by the Committee confirms that it is primarily
prosecutors, not defense counsel, who are the sources of the problem.
A second study by the organized bar, the Special Committee on
Radio, Television and the Administration of Justice of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York (hereinafter New York Study),80
came to a similar conclusion. As with the Advisory Committee Report,
the New York Study found it unnecessary to go beyond judicial
opinions to find support for its conclusion that "the prosecuting
attorney is frequently the source of highly publicized information
about an apprehended suspect and his relationship to the crime that
has been committed. The press conference called by the district
attorney and the planned 'leak' are frequent occurrences." 8 '
8 2 the New York Study cited
In addition to Stroble v. California,
the opinions of reviewing courts in People v. Brommel,83 State v.
77. See generally id. app. C at 234-39.
78. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.

79. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
80.

Ass'N OF THE

BAR

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO,

TELEVISION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TERIALS (Interim

Report 1965) [hereinafter

81. Id.at 33.

A

DOCUMENTED SURVEY OF MA-

NEW YORK STUDY].

82. 343 U.S. 181 (1952). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
83. 364 P.2d 845 (Cal. 1961).
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Orecchio, 4 Irvin v. Dowd,85 United States v. Milanovich,8 6 Massicot
v. United States,8 7 and Henslee v. United States.88 In Brommel, the
prosecutor released to the press copies of confessions and admissions
subsequently determined to have been inadmissible as evidence. 9
Orecchio involved a public official charged with malfeasance in office,
shortly before whose trial the prosecutor participated in a television
broadcast discussing misconduct by public officials in the county. 9°
In Irvin, the prosecutor released press announcements stating that the
defendant had confessed to six crimes. Although the defendant was
convicted, the conviction was subsequently reversed, and a new trial
made necessary, because of excessive pretrial publicity to which the
prosecutor had contributed. 9 The prosecutor in Milanovich volunteered to a radio station information about the defendant's prior
arrests and convictions, 92 and in Massicot the prosecutor released the
confession of one defendant which implicated two others. After the
trial judge deleted references to the other defendants, the prosecutor
again reported to the media that the confession had implicated all
defendants. 93 Finally, in Henslee, the prosecutor, during trial, filed
an unnecessary motion in a related civil action, asserting that the
defendant had committed crimes not the subject of the criminal
prosecution. As in Irvin, the reviewing court concluded that the
94
prosecutor's conduct had rendered a new trial necessary.
. The New York Study found illustrations of improper defense
attorney publicity more difficult to locate. Rather than limiting its
review to cases in which defense counsel publicity was criticized by a
reviewing court, as it had with prosecutors, the New York committee
apparently found it necessary to do its own research, relying on
newspaper reports, government briefs, law journal notes, and dissenting opinions expressly rejected by a majority of the court. The

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
P.2d 845
90.
1953)).
91.
92.
93.
94.

99 A.2d 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953).
366 U.S. 717 (1961).
303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876 (1962).
254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
246 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1957).
NEW YORK STUDY, supra note 80, at 33-34 (citing People v. Brommel, 364
(Cal. 1961)).
Id. at 36 (citing State v. Orecchio, 99 A.2d 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

37-38.
38-39.
39-40.
40-42.
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Study contains a 13-page chapter95 devoted exclusively to six illustrations of what is judged to be improper publicity by defense counsel.
As in the Advisory Committee Report, the New York Study relies
heavily on the dissenting opinion in Bloeth96 and the brief submitted
by the losing party in Sheppard.9 In neither case does the opinion of
the court cite to an instance of improper defense counsel publicity.
The remaining four cases cited by the New York Study begin
with the Los Angeles trial of several persons accused of kidnapping
Frank Sinatra, Jr. 9 In that case, defense counsel used the press to
publicize the claim that Sinatra had engineered a "hoax" kidnapping
for personal reasons. The only instance cited that occurred before
jury sequestration was possible was an article appearing 3,000 miles
from the place of trial, in the Miami Herald.9 That the attorney
publicity did not prevent a fair trial is made evident by its lack of
success - all defendants were convicted. I°° Interestingly, the New
York Study does not mention the announcement by J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that the accused had
previous criminal records. This statement was untrue. 01
The next case relied on in the New York Study is Atlanta
Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes,0 2 in which a ban on television, radio
and photographic facilities in the area surrounding the courthouse
95. Id. ch. 6, at 43-55. Chapters One through Five of the New York Study
contain over thirty illustrations of fair trial problems created by police officials,

prosecutors, the press, or the failure of judges to protect the judicial process. Id. ch.
1-5, at 3-42.
96. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1956). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
97. State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910
(1956). See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
98. NEw YORK STUDY, supra note 80, at 43-44.

99. Id. at 43 ("The defense indicated Thursday it may try to prove in court
that Frank Sinatra, Jr. told policemen at a mountain road-block 'not to worry ...

the kidnap was just a joke."'). The other illustrations included a mention of the

publicity on a television network's evening news, an article in a Portland, Oregon

newspaper, and one Los Angeles Times article, all occurring after the jury was
empaneled. Id. at 43-44.
100. Gladwin Hill, 2 in Sinatra Case Given Life Terms, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8,
1964, § 1, at 1; see Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 387 (1962) ("There is nothing
in the record to indicate that the [grand jury] investigation was not ultimately
successful or, if it was not, that the petitioner's conduct was responsible for its

failure.").
101.

DONALD

M.

GLLMOR, FREE

PRESS

AND FAIR TRL

68 (1966).

102. 114 S.E.2d 421 (Ga.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 290 (1960); see NEw YoRK
STUDY, supra note 80, at 44-45.

1992:3991

TRIAL PUBLICITY

was upheld. The inclusion of this case is somewhat difficult to
understand, since the issue raised and decided was the proper interaction between the desire of the news media to '"[take] pictures of
spectators and other persons not in custody of the court, on the
streets and sidewalks surrounding the courthouse," ' ' 0 3 and the power
of a trial judge "to enforce rules [bearing] a reasonable relationship
to ... maintenance of the dignity of the court and the orderly
administration of justice."' 4 Although the facts as stated by the
Georgia Supreme Court indicate that defense counsel twice made
statements to the press, °5 neither that court nor the trial court which
entered the order, nor the parties' °6 appeared in any way concerned
with, or perceived the case as involving, excessive defense counsel
publicity. 0 7
The remaining two illustrations are of even less assistance in
finding defense attorney impropriety. One is the espionage trial of
Robert Glenn Thompson, 08 prior to which radio stations had broadcast that Thompson had been dishonorably discharged from the Air
Force. His attorney cooperated with the press by permitting Thompson
to display his honorable discharge papers, but made no statements
himself.' 9 The other is an unidentified case which was still pending
at the time of the study." 0 In this case defense counsel told the press
that he could prove his client's innocence of certain of the charges,
that the police were guilty of misconduct, and that public officials
should be accountable for injustices they commit."' A few days later
the charges referred to were dropped. The only other statement
actually described in the study in connection with this case amounted

103. 114 S.E.2d at 423.
104. Id. at 425.
105. Id. at 425-26.

106. In addition to the issue resolved by the Supreme Court, the parties raised

issues concerning "the redress of libel, the power of the courts to punish for contempt
and the individual's right of privacy." 114 S.E.2d at 423.
107. Indeed, the only commentator other than the authors of the New York
Study who seemed to view Grimes as a "defense counsel publicity" case was the law

student who wrote the five page case note which the New York Study quoted

considerably more extensively than it did the court's opinion. Joseph P. Summers,
Note, 36 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 77 (1960); see NEW YORK STUDY, supra note 80,at

44-45.

108. See

NEW YORK STUDY,

109. Id. at 45.
110. See id. at 48-50.
111. Id.

supra note 80, at 45-46.
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to an assertion by the attorneys that the accused maintained his
2
innocence."1
Other substantial studies of the problem of trial publicity have
been independently conducted."13 The primary value of these studies
is their extensive research into and disclosure of large numbers of
high publicity criminal cases. Alfred Friendly, a journalist, and Ronald
L. Goldfarb, an attorney, reviewed twenty notorious cases in which
4
publicity was a real or potential difficulty in maintaining a fair trial."
Only two of these cases involved attorney publicity. From the first,
Sheppard v. Maxwell,"' Friendly and Goldfarb cite three statements
made by the prosecutor and reported in the press: 1) "There is too
much delay here""' 6 (referring to the progress of the investigation); 2)
7
"There is strong circumstantial evidence against Dr. Sheppard";"
and 3) "We think we have a strong case.""' The second is an
unidentified case in which, immediately after the trial judge ruled
certain evidence inadmissible during a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor
provided the evidence to the press in the judge's outer chambers." 9
In all of the other cases, publicity by the news media was extensive
and the study documents examples of publicity by eye witnesses, 2 0
police officials,' 2 ' coroners, 122 mayors, 23 judges, 124 the defendant, 25
United States Commissioners, 26 Congressional committees, 2 7 and even
the President of the United States. 21 In this careful and detailed
112. NEW YORK STUDY, supra note 80, at 49 ("[Tlwo defense lawyers for [the
accused] - one his former counsel and the other his present counsel - declared
yesterday that on two occasions [the accused] had been given 'truth serums' . . . and
that under the drugs he had consistently maintained his innocence ... of the ...

murders.") (quoting The N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1965).
113. ALFRED FRIENDLY & RONALD GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY: THE IMPACT
OF NEWS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967); JOHN LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE
PREsS (1966).
114. FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 113, at 13-30, 160-92.
115. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
116. FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 113, at 15.

117. Id. at 17.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id. at 192 n.10.

120. Id. at 181-82, 184-85.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

16-17, 21-22, 166, 167 n.1, 172, 182-86, 208.
16.
17.
190-91.
25-26, 29-30, 185-86.

126. Id.at 172, 178.

127. Id. at 175-77.
128. Id. at 178-79.
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analysis, however, not a single instance of arguably improper publicity
by a defense attorney is cited and the authors recommend that defense
counsel be excluded from publicity restrictions, 29 a recommendation
rejected by the American Bar Association Advisory Committee. 130
Another study was authored by Mr. John Lofton, a journalist,
who examined his profession's role in the problem of trial publicity.'3 2
The section of his book which discusses attorney trial publicity
mentions four cases, all of which involved prosecutorial publicity.
Considering the first, Stroble v. California,3 a Mr. Lofton points out
that the prosecutor disclosed to the press the details of an alleged
confession and expressed his opinion regarding the accused's sanity
and guilt. 3 4 These statements prompted Justice Frankfurter to characterize the prosecutor as "a conscious participant in trial by news35
paper."'P
Mr. Lofton's description of the second case, United States v.
Leviton, 136 indicates that the prosecutor, at a press conference, released
information damaging to the accused that was never introduced at
trial. 137 In the third case, United States v. Rosenberg,3 8 the prosecutor's press release suggested that a witness had been subjected to a
perjury indictment for failing to keep a promise to testify against the
accused. 3 9 Lastly, in People v. Hryciuk,'4° the prosecutor publicly
to various crimes in addition
asserted that the accused had confessed
14
to that for which he was being tried.'

129. Id. at 135-36, 247-48. "Our . . . specific disagreement with . . . the [Advisory Committee's] recommendations has to do with its strictures on disclosure by
defense counsel." Id. at 135.
130. 1968 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 19-20 ("Several comments on the report have suggested that the proposed restrictions ought not to apply
to defense counsel at all .... While recognizing the difficulty and importance of
the question, the Committee believes that the proposed restriction should be retained

. .

").

131. LOFTON, supra note 113, at xiv ("One aim of this book is to examine how
newspapers flout the rights of due process.").
132. Id. at 218-26.
133. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
134. LOFTON, supra note 113, at 222.
135. Stroble, 343 U.S. at 201 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1952).
LoFroN,

supra note 113, at 222.

200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953).
LoFToN, supra note 113, at 223.
125 N.E.2d 61, 64 (I11.1954).
LoFroN, supra note 113, at 223.
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Mr. Lofton does refer in a few paragraphs 42 to publicity by
defense attorneys, pointing out that such publicity occurs almost
exclusively when the defendant has been the target of an attack by
police and prosecutors in the press. In neither his general examination,
nor the portion of his work devoted to attorney publicity, however,
does Mr. Lofton disclose an instance in which defense attorney
publicity had an impact on the outcome of the litigation. Indeed, his
general conclusions about attorney publicity are worthy of note:
Among attorneys, public prosecutors are most addicted
to publicity-seeking .... A prosecutor's election or re-election
depends largely on the reputation he has with the public. And
the press is one means of building a reputation . .. .14
Not only do prosecutors use the press to promote their
personal reputations, but they also use it to help them secure
convictions. The prosecution practice of trying cases in the
newspapers is so universal that any district attorney's reluctance to do so becomes a matter for comment.'"
Professor Robert D. Drechsel has taken a different approach to
the investigation of attorney trial publicity.' 45 Rather than examining
specific cases, Professor Drechsel has looked to the frequency and
nature of contacts between the legal profession and the news media.
Considering the frequency of contact, one study concluded that nonmetropolitan daily newspaper reporters in Minnesota relied heavily
on prosecutors and other government officials, but little on defense
attorneys, as sources of information.'" Another indicated that fortyone percent of prosecutors in Minnesota reported at least weekly
contact with the press, while no public defenders reported such
frequent contact. 147 In contrast, nineteen percent of Minnesota public
defenders, but only two percent of prosecutors, reported that they
never had contact with the press during the past six months. 4s The
responses of Minnesota prosecutors and public defenders indicated
142. Id. at 225-26.
143. Id. at 220.
144. Id. at 221. Mr. Lofton notes that District Attorney of New York County
Frank Hogan's decision to prohibit his staff from disclosing evidence and statements
"prompted widespread discussion among newsmen and attorneys." Id.
145. Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations:
What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests about the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1989).
146. Id. at 24.
147. Id. tbl. 2 at 26.
148. Id.
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that the former were almost two and one-half times more likely to
volunteer information to reporters, 49 and the reporters indicated that
eighty-one percent rarely or never received volunteered information
from defense attorneys, while forty-two percent occasionally or fre50 Summarizing
quently received such information from prosecutors.
these studies, Professor Drechsel concludes, "[tihe frequency of contact reported by Minnesota prosecutors suggests that prosecutors are
in a position to influence journalist's agendas. The frequency of
contact with Minnesota prosecutors versus defense attorneys suggests
a prosecutorial -bias that might lead to claims of prejudicial news
coverage."' 5 '
Examining the nature of the assistance provided by these contacts,
Professor Drechsel demonstrates that, in four areas of the country,
twenty-one percent more prosecutors than defense attorneys reported
that they have provided or would provide factual information about
a case. Five percent more indicated that they have expressed or would
express opinions or speculation and twenty-one percent more prosecutors have or would have made suggestions steering reporters to
have
stories. Finally, nine percent more prosecutors have or would
52
coverage.
worth
was
case
a
whether
provided help deciding
When the same questions were asked of reporters in Minnesota,
seventeen percent more indicated that they obtained factual information about cases from prosecutors than from defense attorneys, five
percent more heard opinions or speculation about cases from prosecutors, twenty-one percent more received suggestions from prosecutors
steering them to stories, and twenty-two percent more obtained help
from prosecutors in deciding whether a case was worth coverage.'
In sum, while the reported studies do not establish that defense
attorneys are never a source of publicity about pending criminal cases,
they do make clear that the problem of attorney trial publicity is
heavily one of prosecutorial publicity. One would expect, therefore,
that the greatest attention of professional regulatory bodies would be
directed toward prosecutors. As the ensuing section suggests, however,
that does not appear to be the case. Rather, the bar seems to have
demonstrated a bias against criminal defense counsel, addressing

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.tbl. 6 at 30.
Id.at tbl. 7.
Id.at 26.
Id. tbl. 4 at 28. The four areas of the country surveyed were Minnesota,

New England, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. Id.
tbl. 5 at 29.
153. Id.
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concern about defense publicity while paying little attention to prosecutors.

IV.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE PROFESSION

It is, of course, impossible to reach any definitive conclusions

about the comparative treatment of attorney trial publicity by professional regulatory bodies. No centralized records of disciplinary proceedings are maintained,154 and instances of private sanctions are not
reported unless confidentiality is waived by the attorney.' Consequently, it is possible that the many instances of improper prosecu-

torial trial publicity disclosed in Part III of this article led to the

imposition of sanctions that were accepted without judicial challenge.
What information is available, however, suggests that while the
problem is largely one of prosecutorial publicity, the response of the
organized bar has been primarily directed toward publicity by defense
counsel 56 and even solicitous of prosecutors.' 57 The application of
restrictions to defense counsel, despite little evidence of their involvement, 5 ' is one illustration of this inclination. Another is an apparently
inconsistent attitude toward responsive publicity. For example, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Gentile expressly proscribes
responsive defense publicity even if it merely neutralizes anti-defense

publicity and does not cause affirmative jury bias.1'9 Yet the Chief

154. The Standing Committee on Professional Discipline of the American Bar
Association maintains a data bank of public sanctions imposed, indicating the number
and nature of the sanctions but not the reasons. See generally A.B.A.

STANDING
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STATISTICAL REPORT: SANCTIONS IMPOSED IN PUBLIC DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

1985-1989 (1990). Instances of confidential private sanctions are not available.
155. E.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2723 (1991).
156. See infra notes 156-202 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 51-79, 95-112, 129, 142-44, 146-52 and accompanying text.
See also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2734-35 (opinion by
Kennedy, J.) ("[T]he absence of anecdotal or survey evidence [of defense attorney
prejudice] in a much-studied area of the law is remarkable. The various bar association
and advisory commission reports ... present no convincing case for restrictions upon
the speech of defense attorneys.").
159. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2747-48 n.6. (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J., plurality)
("A juror who may have been initially swayed from open-mindedness by publicity
favorable to the prosecution is not rendered fit for service by being bombarded by

publicity favorable to the defendant."). But see id. at 2728 (opinion by Kennedy, J.)
("Far from an admission that he sought to 'materially prejudic[e] an adjudicative
proceeding,' petitioner sought only to stop a wave of publicity he perceived as
prejudicing potential jurors against his client and injuring his client's reputation in
the community."). Neither of these two views was joined by a majority of the Court.
See generally id. at 2748-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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417

Justice makes no mention of the fact that the prosecutor responded
to attorney Gentile's press conference, ' 6° a response that, as far as
can be determined, went unpunished. Indeed, one of the reasons the
American Bar Association Advisory Committee recommends application of restrictions to defense counsel is that "it is hard to see how
to remain silent in the face of a
the prosecution can be expected
16'
media.'
the
in
defense crusade
Furthermore, the other reasons why the Advisory Committee
162
"believe[d] that the [defense counsel] restriction should be retained"
suggest some irrationality. One is the almost ludicrous suggestion that
since the defendant himself can not be restricted, the prosecution is
"already somewhat disfavored."' 163 The reality of a criminal prosecution is quite to the contrary. The very existence of a charge or
indictment informs the community that the police, the committing
magistrate, the grand jury and the prosecutor all have concluded that
there is adequate evidence against the accused to proceed with a
prosecution. Indeed, the indictment itself presents the public with
information tending toward guilt. Moreover, community attitudes
toward criminals and social and political values about crime in general
are likely to put the accused in a disfavored position. Finally, media
publicity adverse to the defendant is often widespread. When one
considers all of these realities, it is difficult to take seriously a concern
that the prosecution is disfavored because it cannot add to the adverse
publicity.
Another reason for the restriction is the Advisory Committee's
own conclusion "that the state's right to a fair trial can be seriously
threatened by defense conduct."' 1 4 The support for this conclusion
65
refers back to Bloeth and Sheppard, neither of which involved
defense publicity that in any way threatened the state's right to a fair
trial. 16 Finally, the Advisory Committee states, "there is often a very
real conflict of interest between the defendant and his attorney in
160. Id. at 2729 (opinion by Kennedy, J.) ("The stories mentioned not only
Gentile's press conference but also a prosecution response and police press conference.").
161. 1968 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 20.
162. Id.
163. Id.

164. Id.
76.

165. Id. n.11, citing 1966 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 19, at 175-

166. See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text. Indeed, in Bloeth the

prosecution's contention was that the defense publicity threatened the defendant's,
not the state's fair trial rights.
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Absolutely no authority for this conclusory asser-

tion is provided, and it suggests that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of assistance of counsel

68

is often a hindrance rather than a help to

criminal defendants. Considered carefully, therefore, the Advisory
Committee's "reasons" seem to be more an unreasoned attempt to
justify a pre-existing bias than a supported explanation for a reasoned
judgment.
Still a third illustration of bias against defense counsel is the total
absence of reported cases of sanctions imposed on prosecutors. There
are to date five reported cases of disciplinary actions taken against
attorneys for assertedly improper extra-judicial publicity in criminal
cases. 69 None involved prosecutors; all involved sanctions on defense
counsel. Even discounting the possibility that prosecutors are less
likely to challenge sanctions, the absence of even a single such case,
in light of the numerous and widely identified illustrations of prosecutorial publicity, is remarkable.
Furthermore, every sanction issued against defense counsel has
been reversed when challenged in court. The United States Supreme
Court struck down the regulatory provision applied in Gentile "in
part [because of] the impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement
(citations omitted), for history shows that speech is suppressed when
either the speaker or the message is critical of those who enforce the
law." 70 The Court indicated that this concern "is of particular
relevance when one of the classes most affected by the regulation is
the criminal defense bar, which has the professional mission to
challenge actions of the State." 7'
In re Sawyer 72 involved a defense attorney who was suspended
from practice for having made a speech highly critical of the manner
in which her client was being tried. Before the Supreme Court, the
Bar Association appears to have acknowledged the general right of
attorneys to speak out on legal matters but asserted that active
167. 1968 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 20.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right ...

to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").

169. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991); In re Sawyer,
360 U.S. 22 (1959); In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1984); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d
483 (N.J. 1982); Markfield v. The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 370 N.Y.S.2d
82, appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612 (1975).
170. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732; id. at 2749 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A]

vague law offends the Constitution because it ...creates the possibility of discriminatory enforcement.").
171. Gentile, 111 S.Ct. at 2732.
172. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
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involvement in pending litigation limited that right. In response, a
plurality of the Court said:
We can conceive of no ground whereby the pendency of
litigation might be thought to make an attorney's out-of-court
remarks more censurable, other than that they might tend to
obstruct the administration of justice. Remarks made during
the course of a trial might tend to such obstruction where
remarks made afterwards would not.'7
Justice Stewart, while not joining the plurality opinion, agreed that
the absence of a charge or finding "that the petitioner attempted to
obstruct or prejudice the due administration of justice by interfering
with a fair trial' ' 7 4 precluded disciplinary action. A majority of the
Court thus agreed that only an attempt to interfere or actual interference with a fair trial would justify discipline, and that Sawyer's speech
had not met this standard.
Another challenge to disciplinary action, Markfield v. The Ass'n
of the Bar of the City of New York, 75 involved suspension proceedings
brought against the defense attorney in a criminal trial involving a
prison riot. During the course of the trial the attorney participated in
a broadcast panel discussion on prison rebellions. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York struck down the disciplinary action, holding that Markfield's publicity did not constitute

an interference with a fair trial .176

In In re Hinds,177 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
regulation of attorney trial publicity "requires a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that an attorney's extrajudicial speech truly jeopardized trial fairness.' ' 7 Dismissing the charges against the attorney,
the Court pointed out that the Ethics Committee had made no factual
findings as to the likelihood that the attorney's statements affected a
fair trial, 79 and stated, "[i]n this instance, we find the imposition of
punishment unnecessary to promote our ethical aims and, therefore,
refrain from doing so.''I8°

173. Id. at 636.

174. Id. at 647 (Stewart, J., concurring).
175. 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612 (1975).

176. Id. at 85.

177. 449 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1982).

178. Id. at 495.
179. Id. at 495, 500.
180. Id. at 497.
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Finally, the defense attorney in In the Matter of Keller' distributed a letter to members of the public attacking the State's credibility
and presenting the merits of the defense. As in Hinds, the State
Supreme Court rejected the disciplinary action because the bar had
imposed sanctions in the absence of any demonstration that the
publicity had impacted upon the trial.
This review of reported cases suggests several conclusions. First,
bar association disciplinary bodies have tended to impose sanctions
on criminal defense attorneys without bothering to examine the actual
impact of the attorney's publicity on the judicial proceeding. Second,
in every instance in which disciplinary action deemed appropriate by
the organized bar has been challenged by defense counsel, the reviewing court has determined that the bar's action was improper or
unconstitutional. Third, the organized bar seems considerably more
concerned with publicity by defense attorneys than by prosecutors,
although every study of the issue has demonstrated that prosecutors
are the primary source of the attorney publicity problem." 2 In this
light, Justice Kennedy's warning about discriminatory enforcement
appears well worth serious consideration.
A final illustration of the organized bar's tendency to accept
prosecutorial publicity more readily than defense publicity comes from
the only occasion on which the bar studied the effect of publicity in
a specific case. The outcome of this study appears in a law review
article written by Oscar Hallam about the trial of Bruno Richard
Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh's
infant child." 3 Dean Hallam served as Chair of the 1936 Special
Committee on Publicity in Criminal Trials of the American Bar
Association, and his article both reflects his own views 8 4 and reproduces the Report of the Special Committee on the Hauptmann trial., 5
Considering the publicity by the attorneys, Dean Hallam provides
the following description:
There was organized publicity on behalf of both the
prosecution and the defense. Counsel for the defense gave out
frequent published statements, announced in the newspapers

181. 693 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1984).
182. See supra notes 26-153 and accompanying text.
183. Oscar Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24
MINN. L. REV. 453 (1940).
184. Id. at 453-77.
185. Report of Special Committee on Publicity in Criminal Trials, reprinted in
Hallam, supra note 183, at 477-508 [hereinafter Special Committee Report].
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his plan of defense in considerable detail, promised 'bombshells' and to spring surprises. Before the trial the chief defense
counsel broadcast arguments for the innocence of his client.
In a public statement shortly after the trial, he characterized
the verdict as 'mob justice.'
The state's attorney refrained at all times from broadcasting and refrained generally from public discussions of the
case. He did, during the trial, hold regular daily conferences
with the Press, as he stated, in the interest of accurate information. Following these conferences, newspapers published
freely comments and forecasts purporting to emanate from
the state's attorneys, some of which went much into detail.
On January 3 the Mirror carried, as 'Lindy Case Lawyers'
Views,' parallel statements of what the prosecution and defense proposed to prove, embellished with some argument.
The state was credited as saying, 'We have an iron-clad case
against Hauptmann and will prove that he murdered the
helpless infant.' The authenticity of this and of some other
newspaper quotations is denied. Very likely the state's attorney's denial is right, very likely the Press unduly enlarged
upon his conference statements, but such a result was not
surprising. 16
Reading the foregoing, one must be struck by several facts. Dean
Hallam describes the actual statements made by defense counsel, but
provides no information about what was said by the prosecutor at his
regular daily press conferences, although the news reports of those
conferences "went much into detail."' 8 7 Notwithstanding these daily
press conferences, Dean Hallam makes the surprising statement,
"[t]he state's attorney ... refrained generally from public discussion
of the case."' 8 8 Further, Dean Hallam seems to accept the prosecutor's
explanation that the daily press conferences were conducted "in the
interest of accurate information,"'' 89 thus suggesting that there is an
appropriate right of response for prosecutors.' ° Finally, Dean Hallam
accepts the prosecutor's assurance that he did not make the one
reported improper statement attributed to him.
186. Hallam, supra note 183, at
187. Hallam, supra note 183, at
188. Hallam, supra note 183, at
189. Hallam, supra note 183, at
190. See supra notes 158-60 and
right of response).

460.
460.
460.
460.
accompanying text (discussing the validity of a
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The Special Committee Report reproduced in Dean Hallam's
article is of a similar vein. Although the Report indicates that both
sides engaged in publicity, 19' over two pages are devoted to descriptions of defense attorney publicity, with ten illustrations, 192 but only
one-half page to prosecutorial publicity, with but two illustrations. 193
Of the ten illustrations of defense counsel publicity, only one, pointing
out "that a man must be considered innocent until proven guilty, that
a mere accusation is not proof of guilt, and that [counsel's] brief
examination of the case had convinced him of the innocence of his
client,' 1 94 occurred before the jury was protected and thus could have
affected the fairness of the trial.195
Examining the prosecutor's publicity, the Special Committee also
reports that the daily press conferences were "in the interest of
accurate information,"'' 96 and gratuitously states, "[the state's attorneys'] preparation and presentation of the case was exceptionally
able.' 19 7 Although the prosecutor apparently held over 40 press
conferences, one each day of the trial, 19 only two especially severe
instances are reported, one on the second day of trial, 199 and the other
about 18 press conferences later. 200 Interestingly, the Special Commit191. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 498, 501.
192. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 498-500.

193. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 501.
194. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 498.
195. These statements were made two days after counsel's appointment. Special
Committee Report, supra note 185, at 498. The trial began on January 2, 1935 and
the jury's verdict was returned on February 14, 1935. Id. at 479. Of the other nine
illustrations, six occurred after the jury was protected, id. at 498-99, and three after
the verdict was rendered. Id. at 499-500.
196. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 501. See supra notes 158-60
and accompanying text (discussing the validity of a right of response).
197. Special Committe Report, supra note 185, at 501.

198. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 501; See supra note 195
(Trial lasted from January 2 through February 14, 1935.).
199. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 501 ("At a press conference
this afternoon at Trenton, Attorney General Wilentz said, 'Mrs. Lindbergh's testimony is loaded with importance and contains something very vital to our case.' He
explained that he was referring to the introduction of the Lindbergh baby's sleeping
garments.") (quoting Crime Inside Job, Reilly Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1935, §
1, at 1, 4).
200. Special Committee Report, supra note 185, at 501 ("Attorney General
David T. Wilentz left the court room exultantly at noon today to walk through the
snow for lunch at the Methodist Episcopal Church. 'We are going to wrap the kidnap
ladder right around Hauptmann's neck,' he said. 'I mean it; that is exactly what we
are going to do, and tomorrow night, we will see our case wound up tightly."')
(quoting The World-Telegram, January 22, 1935).
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tee seems unwilling to suggest that the prosecutor actually made these
statements, but says only that the press reports "purport[ed] to
emanate from the state's attorneys [and] were allowed to stand

uncontradicted. "201

In sum, it appears that both the Special Committee and its Chair
were seeking to find support for criticism of defense counsel, and
only reluctantly included prosecutorial publicity in their reports. Indeed, the most informative and enlightening part of the Special
Committee's Report is its expressed views about apologies. Discussing
the defense attorney's issuance of public statements, the Committee

says, "[h]e offers no apologies for doing

sO. ' ' 202

About the prosecu-

tor's regular daily press conferences, the Committee says, "[wie regret
the necessity for criticism.' '203 Both were found to have contributed
to the extrajudicial publicity; only the defense attorney was called
upon for an apology. Criticism of the prosecutor was deemed a
regrettable necessity.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Rehnquist majority opinion in Gentile established that regulation of trial publicity by both prosecutors and defense counsel may
constitutionally be imposed under a lower standard than that applicable to the media and general public. The Kennedy majority struck
down the State Bar of Nevada's regulatory scheme in part because of
the risk of discriminatory enforcement. As the former holding is
applied, professional disciplinary bodies must bear in mind the latter
as well.
Available evidence suggests that discriminatory enforcement is
indeed a matter for concern. As it enforces its rules, the bar must
come to recognize that the problem of trial publicity is primarily one
of improper prosecutorial publicity, that either no right of response
exists or that it applies equally to both sides, and that notions of
defense attorneys as being in need of special regulation, not necessary
for prosecutors, must be rejected.
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